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Current Prospects For An Indigent's Right
To Appointed Counsel And A Free
Transcript In Civil Litigation
The past decade has witnessed the judicial elimination of many
financial barriers which once served to impede the path of the indigent
litigant seeking access to the courts in civil cases.' In striking down
certain bonds and fees, the United States Supreme Court has employed
the due process 2 and equal protection8 clauses of -the fourteenth amend-
ment. The California courts, on the other hand, have recognized a
common law authority reposing in a court to waive its own fees upon
application by an indigent litigant in a civil case,4 and have made that
waiver mandatory upon a proper showing of indigency by the litigant.'
While the lot of the indigent civil litigant seeking to avail himself of
the judicial processes has, therefore, steadily improved, neither the
federal nor the state courts have yet announced a broad right to a
transcript on appeal or a right to appointed counsel in civil actions
comparable to that enjoyed by indigent defendants in criminal cases.'
Although the prospects are not promising for further extension of
indigent rights under the constitutional or common law rationales, limit-
ed expansion may occur due to two recent California appellate decisions
wherein statutes were liberally construed to confer upon indigent parties
a right to a transcript and a right to appointed counsel in selected civil
actions.
7
This comment will first consider the theoretical limitations of the
constitutional and common law arguments favoring the right to free
counsel and a transcript for the indigent civil litigant. Next it will discuss
the question of cost, in terms of manpower and money, of affording
1. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971); Earls v. Super. Ct., 6 Cal. 3d 109, 490 P.2d 814, 98 Cal. Rptr. 302
(1971); Ferguson m. Keays, 4 Cal. 3d 649, 484 P.2d 70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1971).
2. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
3. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
4. Martin v. Super. Ct., 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917).
5. Earls v. Super. Ct., 6 Cal. 3d 109, 490 P.2d 814, 98 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971);
Ferguson v. Keays, 4 Cal. 3d 649, 484 P.2d 70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1971).
6. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956).
7. Crespo v. Super. C., 41 Cal. App. 3d 115, 115 Cal. Rptr. 681 (2nd D.C.A.
1974); In re Simeth, 40 Cal. App. 3d 982, 115 Cal. Rptr. 617 (2nd D.C.A. 1974).
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such rights. Finally, it will review the two recent California decisions
wherein the courts announced a right to counsel and a transcript.'
THEORETICAL OBSTACLES TO THE EXPANSION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RATIONALE
Traditionally, the rights of indigents before the bar have rested on the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.9 Analyti-
cally, therefore, any argument extending a right to counsel or transcript
must probably demonstrate that prior decisions lead straightaway to the
conclusion that their provision to the indigent civil litigant is a constitu-
tional imperative. The path from prior decisions to such a conclusion is
not straight or easy, however, and any such argument will have to
contend with a number of stumbling blocks. The two sections following
deal, therefore, with due process and equal protection. In the analysis of
each, the discussion will commence with a description of the tests
employed by the courts to give force to the bare words of the Constitu-
tion, then proceed to consider the current application of these tests to
obtain waiver of court fees for the indigent, and finally undertake to
explore the possibility that the tests as applied in fee waiver cases will be
extended to obtain counsel or a transcript for the indigent civil
litigant.
A. Due Process
Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the majority in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank and Trust Co.,' summarized the Court's interpretation
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment:
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract
words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that
at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty, or prop-
erty by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. 1
Under the procedural due process line of cases, the Court has begun to
address the question of what interests are properly classified "liberty"
and "property".
Liberty apparently includes not merely freedom from bodily restraint,
but also the individual's right to engage in a common occupation, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, to establish a home and bring up
children, and to worship God according to the dictates of his own
8. See cases cited in note 7 supra.
9. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
10. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
11. Id. at 313.
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conscience." Further, a person's interest in his good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity is considered to fall under the aegis of "liberty.13
The protection of "property" extends to interests created and defined
"by existing rules 'or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.""'
Rights conferred by statute are, therefore, considered property interests.
Once it has been determined that an interest falls within the protection
of "liberty" or "property", and that due process requires notice and
hearing prior to the impairment of that interest through state action,
there still remains open the issue of what process is due.
As indicated above in Justice Jackson's remark, the conduct of the
hearing and the procedures followed there must be appropriate to the
nature of the case. Due process is a flexible concept, and in each
situation a court will weigh the competing interests of state and individ-
ual and mandate greater or lesser procedural protection to the individual
as the balance dictates.1 5 The hearing may be informal, without right to
call or cross-examine witnesses,' 6 or formal, with full right to written
notice, presentation of witnesses in one's support, confrontation of op-
posing witnesses, and a neutral hearing officer and written decision,
depending on the state and individual interests in contention.' 7 In some
cases, the interests at stake may be such that the right to be heard
requires access to a trial court,' 8 or to appellate review, 19 or to appointed
counsel.20 It is within this context that the cases of indigents seeking
access to the courts must be framed.
1. Waiver of Bonds and Fees
In Boddie v. Connecticut,21 the Supreme Court declared invalid
12. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972), citing Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922).
13. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972), citing Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1970).
14. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
15. Id. at 570.
16. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975).
17. See Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).'
18. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (dissolution of marriage).
19. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (criminal conviction).
20. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (revocation of parole or probation).
"mhe effectiveness of the rights guaranteed [to a defendant in a parole or probation
revocation hearing] by Morrisey may in some circumstances depend on the use of skills
which the probationer or parolee is unlikely to possess." Id. at 786. Included among
those guaranteed rights are, "(c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present wit-
nesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses . .. ." 408 U.S. at 489. Thus, in instances where these rights may be im-
paired by a defendant's lack of counsel, as where the case is a complex one, the state's
asserted interest in economy and in a flexible, informal format must give way and coun-
sel must be appointed. 411 U.S. at 786-88.
21. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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Connecticut statutes requiring payment of court fees and cost of service
of process as a condition precedent to suing for divorce, where those
statutes operated to bar an indigent from bringing suit to dissolve a
marriage.22 One's interest in seeking divorce may be classed as a right
grounded in either property or liberty, and Mr. Justice Harlan, writing
for the Court, seems to dip his pen in both wells. The right to seek a
divorce is one granted by statute,2 and is thus a property right.24 How-
ever, because it involves marriage and the adjustment of that "funda-
mental human relationship," 2 it might also be listed as a liberty inter-
est.26 'Whether classified as a liberty or property interest, it is sufficient
to animate the right to be heard.
That right to be heard is unconstitutionally denied, the Court held,
where, as in divorce, the means of settlement lies exclusively with the
state, and where fee statutes operate to bar the indigent from the
adjudicating tribunal. The opportunity to be heard is not denied, even
where access to the court is in some manner obstructed, in those disputes
capable of being resolved privately between the parties. 28 Thus the due
process clause mandates access to the courts by the indigent civil litigant
only when, as with a party seeking divorce, he or she is compelled to
seek resolution in the courts or abandon a claim of right altogether.
Two subsequent United States Supreme Court cases seem to indicate
that the Court is not interested in broadening the scope of Boddie. In
U.S. v. Kras,29 the Court voted 5-4 to reverse the district court, and held
that an indigent was not entitled to a waiver of filing fees which were a
condition precedent to consideration of his petition for bankruptcy. Mr.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, noted that the state did not
possess the exclusive means of settlement, since the debts which Kras
sought to discharge in bankruptcy could also be privately negotiated
with his creditors.8 0 Two months later, the Court once again refused to
soften the standards announced in Boddie. In Ortwein v. Schwab, 1 the
Court held that due process did not require waiver of an appellate fee
for a welfare recipient seeking judicial review of a departmental decision
to reduce welfare benefits. In a per curiam opinion which echoed Kras,
22. id. at 374.
23. Id. at 376.
24. See text accompanying note 14 supra; see also 401 U.S. at 379.
25. 401 U.S. at 382-83.
26. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
27. 401 U.S. at 381.
28. id. at 375-76. "[We know of no instance where two consenting adults may
divorce and mutually liberate themselves from the constraints of legal obligations that
go with marriage, and more fundamentally the prohibition against remarriage, without
invoking the State's judicial machinery." Id. at 376.
29. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
30. Id. at 445.
31. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
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the Court observed that resort to the judicial system was not the only
means of settlement, inasmuch as petitioner had a right to, and had
received, a hearing at the departmental level.32 Thus, where a meaning-
ful right to be heard has been afforded, -there is no denial of due
process. 33 It is clear, then, after the Boddie line of cases, that the Court
is not willing to employ due process to mandate waiver of fees which bar
access to the court to the indigent party except in those few situations
where resort to the court is the exclusive channel through which the
indigent may lay claim to his statutory entitlement. 4 This requirement
of exclusivity is the common thread running from Boddie and the rights
of indigents in the civil area to Griffin v. Illinois3 5 and the rights of
criminal defendants. The thread must be followed to understand why
indigents can always obtain transcripts as a matter of right in criminal
cases, but seldom in civil proceedings.
2. The Right to a Transcript
In Griffin, the Court held that the state's refusal to furnish a free
transcript to a convicted indigent defendant constituted a denial of due
process, where the transcript was necessary for preparation of an effec-
tive appeal." The analysis of the procedural due process cases discussed
earlier appears to be applicable here. The criminal defendant has a
statutory right to appeal his conviction, even as Gladys Boddie had a
statutory right to seek divorce. The criminal defendant possesses no
other means of resolving his dispute other than by resort to the courts,
32. Id. at 659-60.
33. 401 U.S. at 377.
34. A recent article referring to Boddie suggests the existence of an evolving con-
stitutional right to meaningfully participate in the litigation process. See McCall, Due
Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in Procedure and Sub-
stance-Class Action Issues, 25 HASf-NGS L.J. 1351, 1378 (1974). The opinion there
expressed concerning the prospects for an expansion of Boddie is more optimistic than
that held by this writer.
It should also be noted that there is another line of reasoning in these three cases
that requires some explication. Mr. Justice Harlan limited his opinion in Boddie very
closely to the facts, and the opinion can be read to state that due process does not re-
quire waiver of court fees to the indigent unless resort to the court system is the ex-
clusive means of settlement, and there is involved for the indigent claimant not merely
a matter of statutory entitlement, but one which touches somehow on a fundamental
interest. 401 U.S. at 382-83. In both Kras and Ortwein, the Court may have taken
this route, for in addition to finding in each case that the state did not possess the ex-
clusive means of settlement, the respective opinions each note that the petitioners' claims
of right did not touch on any fundamental interest. 409 U.S. at 445 (bankruptcy); 410
U.S. at 659 (welfare benefits). If the court is in some manner giving more weight to
"fundamental" interests in its determination of whether the right to be heard is to be
extended, then it is proceeding inconsistently with its later formulation in Roth, wherein
it announced that impairment of any liberty or property interest by the state required
some prior hearingL See 408 U.S. at 569-71. "Weight" of the competing interests is
to be taken into account only in determining the form of the hearing. Id. at 570.
35. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
36. Id. at 18-20.
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even as Gladys Boddie was obviously incapable of obtaining a divorce
other than through the courts. The indigent criminal defendant, prior to
Griffin, could be cut off from this right to appeal by his inability to
purchase a trial transcript, even as the fee statutes stood between Gladys
Boddie and her action for divorce. Any attempt to transplant in toto the
doctrine of free transcripts from the criminal into the civil area is
unlikely to be fruitful, however. Always there is the limiting factor
explicit in Boddie and implicit in Griffin: the indigent must be able to
show that he possesses no other means save resort to the courts to secure
his claim of entitlement. In most civil actions, where private settlement is
theoretically possible, this element is not satisfied. The right to ap-
pointed counsel, however, is on a different footing entirely.
3. The Right to Counsel
As indicated above, once the right to be heard is determined, the form
of the hearing is dictated by the relative weights of the contending
interests . 7 The right to appointed counsel is such a matter of form, 8
and therefore is determined by balancing the interests at stake. 9 Thus,
if the question of the indigent's right to trial is not in doubt, but only his
right to have appointed counsel at that trial, the courts will look to the
weight of his asserted interest. Two lines of cases in the state and lower
federal courts bear out the proposition that where there is involved some
fundamental interest,40 counsel will be afforded to an indigent party.
Some jurisdictions have afforded counsel as a matter of right to the
indigent defendant in civil actions where there was a possibility of
incarceration41 In the other line of cases, a number of courts have
extended to indigent parents a due process right to counsel in proceed-
ings where the state seeks to deprive them of the custody of their
children.42 The factors mentioned in support of that right demonstrate
37. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
38. This is implicit in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975), where the Court
considers right to counsel in its discussion of what process is due at the hearing after
the right to the hearing itself has been established.
39. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783-91 (1973) (granting condi-
tional right to counsel in parole and probation revocation hearings), applying the weigh-
ing test to the question of right to appointed counsel.
40. See notes 58-63 and accompanying text infra, for discussion of what constitutes
a fundamental right.
41. See In re Grand Jury, 468 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1972) (right to appointed coun-
sel in civil contempt proceeding based on witness's refusal to answer questions before
a grand jury); Otton v. Zaborac, 525 P.2d 537 (Alaska 1974) (appointed counsel in non-
support action); In re Harris, 69 Cal. 2d 486, 446 P.2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1968),
(appointed counsel in civil mesne process proceeding); People ex rel. Amendola v. Jack-
son, 74 Misc. 2d 797, 346 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (appointed counsel in non-
support action); Commonwealth v. Hendrick, 220 Pa. Super. 225, 283 A.2d 722 (1971)
(appointed counsel in non-support action).
42. See, e.g., Danforth v. State Dep't of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me.
1973).
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the courts' weighing approach: (1) the fundamental nature of the child-
parent relationship; 3 (2) the accusatory nature of the proceedings; 44
(3) the complexity and technical nature of the proceedings; 4 5 (4) the
vastly greater resources available to the state;4 6 (5) the possibility that in
cases where the issue turns on alleged parental abuse, the parent might
make statements giving rise to criminal liability.
4 7
A weighing test of this sort does not augur well for extension of a
right to appointed counsel in civil suits, where there often may be
involved matters of property, but where there are seldom interests
denominated as "fundamental." Here, then, the theoretical rationale
supporting the present due process rights of indigents appears unable to
support an extension of those rights. Thus the indigent civil litigant, if
he is to find refuge in the Constitution with respect to questions of
counsel or transcripts, may choose to seek it in the marginally more
open embrace of the equal protection clause.
B. Equal Protection
In determining whether a citizen has been denied equal protection
under the law, the Court first looks to see whether the rule or statute
sought to be challenged operates to classify some portion of the citizenry
to the disadvantage of another portion.48 If that classification is "sus-
pect," 4 9 because it is based on race, 50 alienage, 51 or nationality, 52 or
43. Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (1974); In re Welfare Luscier, 84 Wash. 2d
135, 524 P.2d 906 (1974); State ex rel. Lemaster v. Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va.
1974); Crist v. Div. of Youth and Family Serv., 128 N.J Super. 402, 320 A.2d 203
(1974); In Interest of Friesz, 190 Neb. 347, 208 N.W.2d 259 (1973); In re B, 30 N.Y.2d
352, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133, 285 N.E.2d 288 (1972); State v. Jamison, 251 Ore. 114, 444
P.2d 15 (1968).
44. In re Welfare Luscier, 84 Wash. 2d 135, 524 P.2d 906 (1974); State ex rel,
Lemaster v. Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1974); Crist v. Div. of Youth and Family
Serv., 128 N.J. Super. 402, 320 A.2d 203 (1974); Danforth v. State Dep't of Health
and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973); In re B, 30 N.Y.2d 352, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133,
285 N.E.2d 288 (1972).
45. See cases cited note 43 supra.
46. Crist v. Div. of Youth and Family Serv., 128 N.J. Super. 402, 320 A.2d 203
(1974); Danforth v. State Dep't of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973).
47. State ex rel. Lemaster v. Oakley, 203 S.E.2d 140 (W. Va. 1974); Crist v. Div.
of Youth and Family Serv., 128 N.J. Super. 402, 320 A.2d 203 (1974); In Interest of
Friesz, 190 Neb. 347, 208 N.W.2d 259 (1973); Danforth v. State Dep't of Health and
Welfare, 303 A.2d 794 (Me. 1973); In re B, 30 N.Y.2d 352, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133, 285
N.E.2d 288 (1972). It should be noted that Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
which confers on criminal defendants in state courts a right to appointed counsel, is
grounded in the sixth amendment. That amendment is, by its express terms, limited to
criminal prosecutions and thus not usually susceptible to application in civil cases.
48. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
49. See generally Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-59 (1969) (Harlan, J.
dissenting).
50. Mclaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
51. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
52. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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if it operates to deprive -the individual of a fundamental right protect-
ed explicitly or implicitly by the Constitution,53 the rule or statute will
be invalidated unless the state can demonstrate that it is required in
order to promote a compelling state interest. 54 However, where the
classification is neither suspect nor operates to affect a fundamental
right, the statute or rule will be upheld so long as the state can show that
it bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose." It is
this second "rational basis" test which the Court has generally applied
in those civil matters involving indigents.
1. Waiver of Bonds and Fees
The majority opinion in Boddie, however, did not mention equal
protection, although two concurring opinions suggested that fee statutes
created a suspect classification based on poverty in instances where fees
served to bar the indigent from the courtroom. 0 Mr. Justice Harlan's
failure to employ an equal protection argument in his majority opinion
may have rested on two grounds. First, despite the assertions of the
concurring opinions, the Court has never held that discrimination based
on wealth alone is sufficient to trigger the compelling state interest
test. 57 Second, while this test can be triggered by a classification affect-
ing a "fundamental interest," the designation of a "fundamental" right
of access to the courtroom in a civil suit would be a departure from the
test for fundamentality announced in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez.58 There, Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, suggested that the question of fundamentality was to be decid-
ed with reference to whether the right claimed is explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution.59 Justice Powell noted four interests
regarded as fundamental: the right to travel; 0 the right to participate in
the electoral process;6" the right to exercise freedoms guaranteed by the
first amendment;62 and the right to procreation.6" The Court appears
disinclined to expand this list.
53. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
54. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
55. San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
56. 401 U.S. at 386 (Douglas, J., concurring), 388-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
57. See Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Consti-
tutional Test For State Financial Structures, 57 CAL. L. REv. 305, 349 (1969). "In
those decisions involving relative wealth as the classifying fact, except where that fact
has been combined with either the voting interest or the interest in fair criminal process,
it has shown no capacity to move the Court." Id.
58. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
59. Id. at 33-34.
60. Id. at 32, citing primarily Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
61. Id. at 34 n.74, citing primarily Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
62. Id. at 34 n.75, citing Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
63. id. at 34 n.76, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Skinner v. Okla-
homa ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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In Kras, 4 the Court found neither a fundamental right65 nor a suspect
class, and invoking the second test, found the fee requirement reason-
ably related to the support of the bankruptcy court system.66 Similarly, in
Ortwein,67 the appellate filing fee requirement was adequately justified
by the need to offset appellate operating expenses. 6 It would be possible
to say that the rational basis test had no teeth at all were it not for a
single decision, Lindsey v. Normet,69 in which it was employed to the
advantage of an indigent petitioner. There, the petitioners challenged
the constitutionality of a statute which required a tenant appealing an
adverse decision in an action for forcible entry and detainer (FED) to
post a bond of twice the rental value of the premises for the period
between commencement of the suit and entry of final judgment. The
bond was required in addition to the normal appeal bond and was
forfeited if the appeal was unsuccessful, a circumstance which, the
Court noted, heavily burdened the statutory right of such a defendant to
appeal.7" Rejecting invocation of the compelling state interest.standard,
the Court invalidated the bond requirement because the classification
between FED appellants and non-FED appellants bore no reasonable
relationship to any valid state objective.71 The Court made it clear that
normal appeal bonds, which do bear a rational relationship to furnishing
the respondent with security for his judgment below, would not be
violative of equal protection.7 " The constitutionality of appeal bonds per
se is not in question then, and two lower court decisions, one decided
before Lindsey and one after, have gone so far as to uphold require-
ments of bonds twice the amount of the lower court judgment against
appellant where, however, only the amount of the judgment was forfeit-
ed upon an unsuccessful conclusion to the appeal. 73 Because most fee
requirements bear some reasonable relation to fiscal support of the
judicial system, the rational basis test would appear to be inadequate to
support an expansion of indigent rights to include even a right to waiver
64. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
65. 409 U.S. at 445.
66. id. at 447.
67. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
68. 410 U.S. at 660.
69. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
70. Id. at 77.
71. 405 U.S. at 76-77.
72. While a State may properly take steps to insure that an appellant post ade-
quate security before an appeal to preserve the property at issue, to guard a
damage award already made, or to insure a landlord against loss of rent if the
tenant remains in possession, the double bond requirement here does not ef-
fectuate these purposes since it is unrelated to actual rent accrued or to specific
damages sustained by the landlord.
Id. at 77.
73. Chidsey v. Guerin, 443 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1971); Patterson v. Warner, 371
F. Supp. 1362 (S.D.W. Va. 1972).
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of all fees, much less to embrace appointed counsel and free transcripts
in civil cases. On the other hand, resort to the compelling state interest
standard has enhanced the position of the indigent before the bar of
criminal justice, and may offer some limited support in the civil area.
2. The Right to a Transcript
Invocation of the compelling state interest test in Griffin v. Illinois7"
wds triggered by a statute which required transcripts on appeal and
which operated, as applied, to erect a classification between those crimi-
nal defendants who could afford transcripts and those who could not,
which classification served to deprive the indigent defendant of his
appeal.7 5 Denial of appeal to those poor, the Court concluded, meant
that many might lose their liberty because of unjust convictions which
the appellate courts would otherwise set aside.71  Physical liberty is
certainly a fundamental right protected under the first amendment right
to freedom of association,77 but the Court has expanded its definition of
liberty -to comport more nearly with that proffered in the procedural due
process cases.
78
In Mayer v. Chicago,79 the Court overturned an Illinois Supreme
Court rule which granted a free transcript only to indigent defendants
convicted of felonies. The Court ruled that notwithstanding the fact
that the defendant had been convicted of a misdemeanor, a free
transcript or reasonable alternative had to be granted for purposes of
appeal. Striking down the state's attempt to distinguish between convic-
tions likely to result in imprisonment and the case under consideration,
which involved a fine, Mr. Justice Brennan observed:
A fine may bear as heavily on an indigent accused as forced con-
finement. The collateral consequences of conviction may be even
more serious, as when (as was apparently a possibility in this case)
the impecunious medical student finds himself barred from the
practice of medicine because of a conviction he is unable to appeal
for lack of funds.80
Just as incarceration deprives a convicted defendant of his liberty,
so the onus or stigma attached to a criminal conviction, even one for
which the penalty is a mere fine, may act to restrict the defendant's
opportunity to earn a livelihood in his chosen profession. This too is a
74. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
75. 351 U.S. at 18.
76. Id. at 19.
77. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
78. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
79. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
80. Id. at 197.
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loss of liberty,81 and it may offer some basis for extension of the com-
pelling state interest test to civil cases. But "liberty" in the sense of
reputation is seldom -the principal issue in civil proceedings, where the
parties are generally contending on matters involving damage to prop-
erty. Even in defamation suits the plaintiff is normally treating his
reputation as a kind of property interest, injury to which is considered
compensable in money damages. Nor was reputation mentioned as
fundamental in San Antonio.82 In some future case, however, an in-
digent appellant seeking a free transcript may persuade the Court to
extend the Griffin-Mayer rationale into the civil area by arguing that
the gravamen of his complaint is an injury to liberty, not property. Of
course, the controversy concerning fundamental and non-fundamental
rights would be mooted if the Court ever decided to abandon the
compelling state interest and rational basis tests.
Mr. Justice Marshall suggested just this in San Antonio, arguing in
fact that previous cases demonstrated that such tests had never really
been followed in any event."' In their stead, he proposed that the Court
scale its standard of scrutiny in each case as the facts indicated: the
more important the interest or invidious the classification, the stricter the
standard of scrutiny.84 There is some basis for believing the Court
adopted this approach in cases ruling invalid statutes which imposed
classifications based on sex 8 and illegitimacy. 6 In each instance, the
Court apparently imposed some standard of scrutiny more strict than the
rational basis test, yet stopped short of declaring all classifications based
on sex or illegitimacy to be suspect.8 7 The inference lies that the
81. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
82. See text accompanying notes 58-63 supra.
83. 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
86. Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
87. In Frontiero, the Court struck down a statute which denied female members
of the armed forces the right to claim their spouses as dependents for the purpose of
quarters allowances, unless those spouses were in fact dependents. The statute placed
no such qualification on males. 411 U.S. at 679. Eight members of the Court, in three
opinions, agreed to invalidate the statute. On the prevailing side, three members
(Powell, J., Burger, CJ., and Blackmun, J.) ruled on due process grounds and expressly
argued against denotation of sex as a suspect class. Id. at 691-92 (Powell, J., con-
curring). Of the five members who concerned themselves with equal protection, only
the four man plurality (Brennan, J., Douglas, J., White, J., and Marshall, J.) was will-
ing to declare sex a suspect classification. Id. at 682. Employing what it termed "strict
judicial scrutiny", id. at 689, the plurality found the discrimination to lack sufficient
justification and to be therefore invalid. It is the plurality's description of its test as
strict judicial scrutiny rather than as compelling state interest which may indicate that
scrutiny is more or less strict depending on the class or nature of interest involved. In
the third concurring opinion, Justice Stewart spoke simply of the statute being based on
"invidious discrimination," id. at 692, and did not indicate the test employed or whether
he considered the class to be suspect.
In Weber, the Court ruled unconstitutional a statute which denied to unacknowledged
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standard adopted was more strict than the rational basis test, yet less
strict than the suspect class-fundamental interest test.
Under such a flexible standard of scrutiny, poverty might well prove
to be a classification deserving of a scrutiny more strict than mere
rational basis, a scrutiny sufficient to invalidate statutes concerning fees
or transcripts which operated to deny to the poor their statutory right to
litigate an issue. The standard of review attaching to a right to appointed
counsel could, if sufficiently strict, invalidate as unjustifiable classifica-
tions embodied in statutes which furnish appointed counsel in some
cases but not in others. Whether the Court is willing to take the Marshall
approach, or, if it is, what standards of review will be assigned to the
various interests and classifications is unclear. But there are other ration-
ales, less abstract than the finely spun gossamer of due process and
equal protection and more firmly rooted in the bedrock of English
common law practice half a milleniumn old, which bear upon the indi-
gent's right to counsel and a transcript.
THEORETICAL OBSTACLES TO THE EXPANSION OF
TiE COMMON LAW RATIONALE
Civil Code Section 22.2 declares the common law of England to be in
force in California insofar as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with
the federal or state constitutions, or laws of the state. The power of the
courts of California to waive fees and bonds which would otherwise bar
the indigent from the courtroom derives from the common law authority
of the English courts to allow litigants to proceed in forma pauperis.8a
However, the California Supreme Court has not yet ruled directly on the
question of whether this common law authority also requires that a
transcript or counsel be furnished as a matter of right to the indigent
civil litigant. The analysis which follows will first consider the successful
use of the common law rationale to obtain waiver of fees, and will
discuss afterward its potential application in cases concerning transcript
and counsel.
illegitimate children the right to share equally in a deceased parent's posthumous work-
man's compensation award with the legitimate children. 406 U.S. at 176-77. Justice
Powell's opinion for the Court does not call illegitimacy a suspect class and yet invali-
dates the statute after speaking of a "stricter scrutiny," id. at 172, and a "significant
relationship" to a legitimate state purpose. Id. at 176. These standards would appear
to fall somewhere between the rational basis and the compelling state interest test. In
Levy, the Court overturned a statute which denied to illegitimate children the right to
recover damages upon the wrongful death of their mother. 391 U.S. at 72. Writing
for the Court, Justice Douglas simply termed the discrimination "invidious," id., without
calling it suspect. Inasmuch as he -cites cases dealing with both rational basis and the
compelling state interest tests, id. at 71, it is not clear which, if either, test is employed.
The inference that it is some sort of middle test arises from its later citation in Weber
as an example of stricter, but perhaps not strictest, scrutiny. 406 U.S. at 172.
88. See Martin v. Super. Ct., 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917).
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A. Waiver of Bonds and Fees
As early as 1917, the California Supreme Court had announced an
authority inherent in the state courts to waive their own fees for an
indigent plaintiff. In the leading case, Martin v. Superior Court,9 the
California Supreme Court noted that except where expressly provided to
the contrary by statute or the constitution, the common law of England
had been ingrafted into the law of California by Political Code Section
4468. 00 The court ruled that inasmuch as the English courts had en-
joyed a right to waive payment of their own fees by indigents,9 the
California courts were similarly empowered. 2 Martin failed to delineate
precisely which court fees were being waived, but it appears that the
plaintiff had paid initial filing fees and was unable to furnish the jury
and reporter's fees required to be deposited with the clerk daily by the
parties to an action.93 Two years later, the California Supreme Court
expressly extended the waiver authority to jury fees. 4
The Martin opinion, broadly phrased so as to include all fees at the
trial court level, including filing fees not immediately at issue there,95
was nevertheless limited significantly in other respects. It did not declare
a right of an indigent to proceed in forma pauperis, i.e. to obtain a
waiver of fees, but rather announced only a power residing in the
superior courts to waive fees as their discretion dictated. 96 Neither did
the Martin opinion extend to fees at the appellate level. In fact, in
Rucker v. Superior Court, a district court of appeal refused to recognize
any common law authority to waive appellate fees.9 7 However, two 1971
cases have had a significant impact on the precedent established by
Rucker.
In Ferguson v. Keays,9" the California Supreme Court extended the
waiver authority to include a right of appellate courts to dispense with
appellate filing fees.9 9 Just as importantly, the Ferguson opinion in-
structed the appellate courts that waiver of fees was not discretionary,
but rather mandatory where an appellant submitted (1) a certificate
signed by counsel affirming that the appeal had merit and was under-
89. 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917).
90. CAL. STATS. 1850, c. 95, p. 219 (currently CAl. CIv. CODE §22.2).
91. 176 Cal. at 293-94, 168 P. at 137.
92. Id. at 296-97, 168 P. at 138. But see La Barbera v. Hart and Crouse, Inc.,
248 App. 261, 289 N.Y.S. 567 (1936), appeal dismissed, 272 N.Y. 534, 4 N.E.2d 435
(1936).
93. 176 Cal. at 291, 168 P. at 136.
94. Majors v. Super. Ct., 181 Cal. 270, 184 P. 18 (1919).
95. 176 Cal. at 296, 168 P. at 138.
96. Id.
97. 104 Cal. App. 683, 685, 286 P. 732, 732 (1930).
98. 4 Cal. 3d 649, 484 P.2d 70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1971),
99. Id.
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taken in good faith and (2) his own declaration, executed under penalty
of perjury, swearing that he was unable to pay the filing fee without
depriving himself and his dependents of the necessities of life, and
setting forth briefly the facts which disclosed his indigence. 100 Ferguson
did not concern fees at trial level, however, and therefore it created an
anomaly whereby the indigent could obtain waiver of appellate fees as a
matter of right, but waiver of trial fees only through exercise of the trial
court's discretion. This anomaly was terminated eight months later by
the decision in Earls v. Superior Court.' There, the California Su-
preme Court limited the discretion of a trial court to deny waiver of fees
to an indigent party, instructing the courts that where a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis is supported by an affidavit sufficient to show
indigency, the motion must be granted. Under Earls, a trial court may
deny waiver of fees only where the truthfulness of the affidavit is in
doubt, and then only after considering conflicting affidavits, or, in rare
instances, after holding a hearing on the matter.10
In addition to fees, i.e., money paid by a litigant directly to an officer
of the court, the waiver authority has also been extended to cover
security for costs, the expenses of litigation which one party must pay to
the other at the conclusion of the suit. 03 In County of Sutter v. Superior
Court,04 a district court of appeal found that the common law courts of
England had enjoyed an authority to dispense with security bonds
which might bar the indigent plaintiff from his day in court. 105 Sutter
dealt specifically with security for costs against a public entity,100 but in
subsequent cases waiver authority has been extended expressly to in-
clude security for costs from a non-resident plaintiff, 0 7 security for costs
on appeal from a justice court,' 08 and injunction bonds.0 9
The trend appears clear. A litigant proceeding in forma pauperis in
California may obtain waiver of fees and costs as a matter of right upon
proper showing of indigency. The courts have balked, however, at
100. Id. at 658, 484 P.2d at 75, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
101. 6 Cal. 3d 109, 490 P.2d 814, 98 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1971).
102. id. at 114, 490 P.2d at 816, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
103. County of Sutter v. Super. Ct., 244 Cal. App. 2d 770, 772 & n.2, 53 CaL. Rptr.
424, 426 & n.2 (1966). If a plaintiff's indigency prevents him from posting security
for costs before trial, his ability to pay those costs afterwards should he lose must be
considered doubtful at best. Thus, the practical effect of waiving security, as the court
in Sutter understood, is to render it unlikely that a successful defendant will be able to
recover his costs from an indigent plaintiff, even where entitled to them by court award.
See id. at 776, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
104. 244 Cal. App. 2d 770, 53 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1966).
105. Id. at 774, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
106. Id. at 771, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
107. Bank of America v. Super. Ct., 255 Cal. App. 2d 575, 63 Cal. Rptr. 366
(1967).
108. Roberts v. Super. Ct., 264 Cal. App. 2d 235, 70 Cal: Rptr. 226 (1968).
109. Conover v. Hall, 11 Cal. 3d 842, 523 P.2d 682, 114 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1974).
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extending the common law rationale to include a right to a free tran-
script and a right to counsel.
B. The Right to a Transcript
Although the California Supreme Court has never decided the issue,
the California appellate courts have continued to hold that the common
law authority to waive fees does not extend to the provision of free
transcripts, 110 and that absent statutory authorization, no free transcript
may be furnished in civil cases.'11 In an early unreported case, the
California Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of mandate which
would have required the superior court to furnish the indigent petitioner
with a free transcript on appeal."' Insofar as the attitude of the current
California Supreme Court appears to be open to question, some histori-
cal perspective is in order.
Ferguson, announcing the right of an indigent appellant proceeding
in forma pauperis to obtain waiver of fees and costs on appeal, partially
overruled the appellate decision of Rucker v. Superior Court,113 which
had previously declared that there was no common law right to appeal
in forma pauperis and no right to obtain a free transcript on appeal.
While overturning Rucker on the question of the right to appeal, Fergu-
son expressly refused to decide whether an indigent must in fact be
furnished the means to pay transcript costs. This refusal, coupled with
the court's more recent denial of a hearing in a case where the issue of
free transcript to the indigent was squarely presented,114 points to the
conclusion that the California Supreme Court's willingness to waive
court costs and fees to indigents does not extend to waiver of such
outside charges as transcript costs. There are two reasons why such a
limitation seems reasonable.
First, there appears to be no common law precedent for furnishing. a
free transcript to the indigent, and the California courts have proved
scrupulous in citing English precedents to support their extensions of in
forma pauperis rights under the common law rationale. 11 5 Second, the
courts possess no statutory authority in a civil case to compensate the
110. E.g., Rucker v. Super. Ct., 104 Cal. App. 683, 685-86,'286 P. 732-33 (1930).
111. E.g., Leslie v. Roe, 41 Cal. App. 3d 104, 116 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1974); Agnew
v. Contractors Safety Ass'n, 216 Cal. App. 2d 154, 30 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1963); Legg v.
Super. Ct., 156 Cal. App. 2d 723, 320 IP.2d 227 (1958),
112. 104 Cal. App. at 686, 286 P. at 732, citing Brandow v. Super. Ct., L.A. No.
11606 (1929).
113. 104 Cal. App. 683, 286 P. 732 (1930).
114. Leslie v. Roe, 41 Cal. App. 3d 104, 116 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1974) (petition for
hearing denied September 25, 1974, id. at 108).
115. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Keays, 4 Cal. 3d 649, 484 P.2d 70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1971); Martin v. Super. Ct., 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917); County of Sutter v.
Super. Ct., 244 Cal. App. 2d 770, 53 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1966).
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reporter out of the public treasury for his costs in preparing a tran-
script,110 and to compel a court reporter to produce a transcript without
compensation at all would violate Rule 4(c) of the California Rules of
Court, which provides that before a request for transcript can be
honored,
[tihe appellant shall either deposit with the clerk an amount of
cash equal to the estimated cost of the transcription with directions
-to apply the same to the fees of the reporter or file with the clerk
a waiver of such deposit signed by the reporter.
Thus, the reasoning which supports a common law right to waiver of
fees and costs would appear possessed of insufficient force to support an
accompanying right to a transcript for indigent civil litigants. 1 7
C. Right to Counsel
Conversely, a strong argument can be made that a right to counsel for
an indigent did exist at common law. A statute promulgated in 1495 by
Henry VII provided that the judge should appoint counsel for the poor
in civil suits.11 The statute remained in effect well into the nineteenth
century,119 when presumably it was absorbed into California law by
Political Code Section 4468.120 Indeed, in Martin v. Superior Court,12'
the same English statute is noted in support of the proposition that the
discretion to waive fees to an indigent civil litigant was a power enjoyed
by ,the common law courts of England and, derivatively, by the present
day courts of California.
122
Any contention that this common law guarantee of counsel to the
indigent in civil cases did not become part of California law under
Political Code Section 4468 can be sustained only by demonstrating that
provision of counsel to the indigent is in some way repugnant or
contrary to the state statutes or constitution. An appellate decision, Hunt
v. Hackett, 23 appears to hold just that. There, the court refused to
acquiesce in the appellant's common law arguments, noting:
116. E.g., Legg v. Super. Ct., 156 Cal. App. 2d 723, 725, 320 P.2d 227, 228 (1958);
Rucker v. Super. Ct., 104 Cal. App. 683, 685, 286 P. 732, 732 (1930).
117. But see Note, California's Appeal In Forma Pauperis-An Inherent Power of
the Court, 23 HAsTNGs L.J. 683, 693 (1972), for the view that the court is inclined
to extend the right to transcript under a common law rationale.
118. In Forma Pauperis Act, II Hen. Vii, c. 12 (1495); see 4 W.S. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 538 (1924); Cappelletti and Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern
Themes and Variations, Part One: The Emergence of a Modern Theme, 24 STAN. L.
REv. 347, 352 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Cappelletti].
119. See Perry v. Walker, 63 Eng. Rep. 293 (1843); Lewis v. Kennett, 38 Eng. Rep.
650 (1872); see also Cappelletti, supra note 118, at 352.
120. CAL. STATS. 1850, c. 95, p. 219 (currently CAL. CIV. CODE §22.2).
121. 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917).
122. Id. at 294-96, 168 P. at 137-38.
123. 36 Cal. App. 3d 134, 111 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1973).
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Whether the appointment of counsel was a part of the common
law of England, as appellant now contends, need not be deter-
mined here, because the current and past practice of California
courts is compelling authority for the ruling of the trial court in
this case.
124
Three observations must be made concerning Hunt. First, the court
entertains a solecism insofar as it asserts that the common law right to
counsel lies beyond the pale of California law because it runs counter to
current and past practice of the California courts. If practice alone were
conclusive, then, reductio ad absurdum, what had not heretofore been
done could not in the future be done, and no change in contemporary
procedures would ever be wrought by the reintroduction of disused
common law principles into current practice. The very Martin decision
itself, wherein the Supreme Court authorized what had not previously
been authorized, the waiver of fees to indigents, could never have been
rendered. The correct rule is that a practice is sufficient to bar introduc-
tion of a common law right into California law only if, upon examina-
tion, the practice appeared to be supported by statutory or constitutional
considerations repugnant to that right.'25 The Hunt .opinion does not
manifest such an examination, however. 12 6 Second, it is clear that the
court never reached the question of whether the common law did in fact
include a right to appointed counsel for indigent civil litigants, and thus
the issue still remains open. Third, everything that the court said con-
cerning the common law right to counsel may possibly be regarded as
dicta, since the court cited three additional factors in support of its denial
of counsel: (1) failure by appellants to contend that their cause of action
was meritorious,'-' (2) failure to file with the superior court a timely
affidavit alleging indigency,118 and (3) failure to make request for
assistance to the public defender, who is statutorily authorized to assist
124. Id. at 138, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
125. See 4 Cal. 3d at 654, 484 P.2d at 73, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
126. Hunt's recitation of California authority rejecting a right to counsel in civil
matters is limited to three cases denying a constitutional right to counsel in proceedings
affecting the dependency status of minors. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 137-38, 111 Cal. Rptr.
at 458, citing In re Joseph T., 25 Cal. App. 3d 120, 101 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1972) and
In re George S., 18 Cal. App. 3d 788, 96 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1971) and In re Robinson,
8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1970). Obviously it does not follow, nor did
the court suggest, that the absence of a constitutional right to counsel implies a consti-
tutional or statutory hostility to a right to counsel grounded in common law. It is note-
worthy, nevertheless, that all three cases have since been expressly overruled on the
grounds that statutes enacted subsequently confer a right to counsel in such proceedings.
See In re Simeth, 40 Cal. App. 3d 982, 115 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1974). If, then, the cases
ever gave force to the argument that the law of California was hostile to a common
law right to counsel, that force is now dissipated. Rather, the very basis on which they
were overturned would tend, if anything, to indicate precisely the contrary.
127. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 136, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
128. Id. at 137, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
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indigents being sued on unjust claims.129 Thus Hunt can be easily
distinguished on its facts from a future case in which an indigent
appellant again raises the common law right to counsel but performs
satisfactorily in those three areas where the Hunt appellant failed.
Despite its historical and analytical soundness, adoption by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court of a common law right to appointed counsel in
civil cases is unlikely. As mentioned above and discussed at length
below, imposition on the judicial system of a right to free counsel in civil
actions would be a matter of presently indeterminable, but probably
substantial, cost. The infirmity of the common law rationale is that it
does not permit a gradual application by limited extensions following
one on the other, thereby allowing the judicial system to absorb the
impact with minimal dislocation. By its nature the common law argu-
ment, if accepted, would confer a right to counsel on all indigent
litigants in all civil cases, a step of extraordinary, if uncertain, magni-
tude, which the courts will probably decline to take.
COST: A PRACTICAL LIMITATION ON ]EXTENSION OF A
RIGHT TO A TRANSCRIPT AND COUNSEL
That the economic and social cost of expanding legal rights to indi-
gents is a matter of concern, at least to some members of the United
States Supreme Court, is manifest in two recent criminal cases. 180 While
it is the rights of indigents in civil actions that are at issue in this
comment, the concerns voiced in these cases are not inapposite. Rather,
given the view that the criminal defendant stands in greater jeopardy
than the civil litigant,13' and thus is entitled to greater constitutional
protection,' 32 the cautionary observations on cost of expanding rights
may have even more weight on the civil side.
In Mayer v. Chicago,1'33 which extended the right to transcript on
appeal to criminal indigents convicted of misdemeanors, Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Burger's concurring opinion focused on the difficulties occasioned by
the provision of transcripts at public expense. Setting aside the economic
cost, which he thought properly chargeable to society's interest in main-
taining a system of justice,8 4 he nevertheless touched on two other
dilemmas: (1) counsel is often more willing to request transcript for
the indigent defendant than for the paying client, since no cost devolves
129. Id. at 138, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
130. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189
(1971).
131. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 391 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
133. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
134. Id. at 201 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
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upon the former,'1 5 and (2) court reporters, unable to cope adequately
with the annually rising number of appeals from indigents and non-
indigents alike, fail to render transcripts promptly, thereby sparking
delays in the resolution of those appeals.13
Six months later, in Argersinger v. Hamlin," the Court announced
that no confinement might be imposed upon a convicted indigent de-
fendant unless he had been provided with an opportunity to be repre-
sented by counsel. In his lengthy concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Pow-
ell, joined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, argued against the majority's flat
requirement of appointed counsel in every case where confinement
might result.13 8 Rather, he suggested that appointment of counsel in
petty offenses be made discretionary with the trial court. 31 Justice
Powell suggested three adverse consequences deriving from the majori-
ty's new rule: (1) the prospect that there would be too few attorneys to
handle the additional caseload, at least in some localities; 140 (2) the
possibility that already overworked courts might prove unable to ade-
quately accommodate the increased workload which would result from
the attempts of appointed counsel to exhaust every potential avenue of
redress for his client;' 41 and (3) the probability that some locales might
not possess the financial resources to make the additional services and
facilities available. 42
It is fair to inquire, however, whether the Court ought properly to
consider the matter of cost when weighing the vital questions of what
safeguards must be furnished to insure justice under the law. Both the
due process and compelling state interest tests discussed above143 pro-
vide that state interest, if sufficiently weighty, may override the indi-
vidual's interest and be determinative in favor of a statute otherwise
invalid.14 4 In Boddie, the state's assertion that the filing fee was neces-
sary to assist in defraying the expenses of the judicial system did not
make it sufficiently compelling in the Courts eyes to override the
petitioner's due process right to litigate her divorce.145 On the other
hand, in Kras and Lindsey, which employed a rational basis equal pro-
tection test, the Court willingly admitted that the requirement of
135. Id. at 200-01 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
136. Id. at 200 & n.1 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
137. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
138. 407 U.S. at 47 (Powell, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 63 (Powell, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 56-59 (Powell, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 58-59 (Powell, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 60-61 (Powell, J., concurring).
143. See text accompanying notes 10-20, and notes 48-55 supra.
144. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 634 (1969); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
145. 401 U.S. at 381,
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fees bears a rational relation to a valid state purpose-operation of the
judicial system.' 45  Thus it is clear the Court does not shrink from
reckoning the cost of the system into its determination of what justice
and the Constitution require. There is, moreover, California dicta favor-
ing the proposition that where a legal issue is neatly poised between two
contending parties, it is proper for the Court to consider the practical
results that will flow from a dcision for one side or the other.
147
Considerations of cost may also be proper in determining whether to
adopt the common law rationale for right to counsel.
In Martin v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court noted that
California law embraced such common law practices as were not incon-
sistent with statutory or constitutional law.148  Expanding on this, the
court made reference to the "spirit" of the law, 49 by which it meant
presumably that a common law rule or practice might fail even though it
violated no express statute if it nevertheless ran counter to some legisla-
tive policy.150 It has for some time been the policy of the State of
California to ensure swift justice and to facilitate the business of the
courts. 15 ' The imposition on the judicial system of any burden such as
right to appointed counsel or free transcript which, though intended to
promote justice, might tend rather to frustrate or delay it (as Mr. Justice
Powell suggests), 52 must be characterized as in some manner contrary
to the spirit of the law. Whether the burden is sufficiently opprobrious to
be termed "repugnant" to or "inconsistent" with the law is of course the
crucial matter for determination, hinging probably on the court's esti-
mate of what demands on its resources can be satisfied without compro-
mising its essential functions.
It is submitted, then, that the burdens to be potentially imposed on
the system of justice, and the cost of those burdens, are proper factors
for the courts to consider in passing on the merits of furnishing counsel
or a transcript to an indigent under either a constitutional or common
law rationale. To the empirical question-what demand on the re-
sources of the community would be created by a rule requiring free
transcript or counsel for the indigent civil litigant-there is unfortunate-
ly no answer. The California cases have reiterated the proposition that
146. 409 U.S. at 447; 410 U.S. at 660.
147. Estate of Sahlender, 89 Cal. App. 2d 329, 345, 201 P.2d 69, 79 (1948).
148. 176 Cal. at 292, 168 P. at 136.
149. Id. at 293, 168 P. at 137.
150. See Ferguson v. Keays, 4 Cal. 3d 649, 654, 484 P.2d 70, 73, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398,
401 (1971).
151. Helbush v. Helbush, 209 Cal. 758, 763, 290 P. 18, 21 (1930); Coats v. Coats,
146 Cal. 443, 444, 80 P. 694, 694 (1905); Shain v. People's Lumber Co., 98 Cal. 120,
122, 32 P. 878, 878 (1893).
152. 407 U.S. at 59 (Powell, J., concurring).
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although the litigant need not plead total destitution to be accorded in
forma pauperis status, he may nevertheless be required to establish that
payment of fees asked of him would be more than merely burdensome
or inconvenient. 153 There appear to have been no studies conducted to
measure the number of potential litigants who would be entitled to, or
who would avail themselves of, such relief under the California stand-
ard. Nor are any statewide statistics maintained concerning the number
of in forma pauperis actions currently authorized each year in Califor-
nia. Even if available, however, current statistics would not provide an
accurate guide, since expansion of rights would logically induce large
numbers of indigent litigants, presently cut off from a legal remedy by
the expense of counsel or transcript, to press their claim in court or on
appeal.'54 While neither the prospective financial impact nor the re-
quirement for additional lawyers can be estimated with any certitude, it
is clear that any extension of rights will impose additional costs which
the courts ought properly to consider. Caution induced by that consider-
ation, and by the theoretical obstacles noted earlier, may have persuaded
some California courts to ground any expansion of such rights in statute
rather than in constitutional or common law.
LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
In two cases analyzed below, one affording transcripts to indigents 55
and one furnishing appointed counsel,156 California appellate courts
have eschewed a common law or constitutional approach. Rather, they
have employed liberal construction: the interpretation of statutory lan-
guage to attain a desired result. The result of this liberal construction
was the provision of counsel or a transcript to the indigent, when a
better reasoned and more restrained reading might have yielded a
contrary result.
By liberally construing legislation, the California courts may skirt two
shoals. First, the need to grapple with the theoretical limitations of the
common law or constitutional arguments does not arise. Second, so long
as the cost factor is both a matter of concern and uncertain in its
dimensions, liberal construction allows the courts to gradually expand
rights and to assess the impact of expansion as it proceeds: to test the
temperature of the water without becoming entirely immersed.
153. Earls v. Super. Ct., 6 Cal. 3d 109, 117, 490 P.2d 814, 818, 98 Cal. Rptr. 302,
306 (1971); Ferguson v. Keays, 4 Cal. 3d 649, 658 n.8, 484 P.2d 70, 75 n.8, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 398, 403 n.8 (1971).
154. Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Anti-Poverty Program, 31 LAw AND
CONTEM. PROB. 211, 217 (1966).
155. Crespo v. Super. Ct., 41 Cal. App. 3d 115, 115 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1974).
156. In re Simeth, 40 Cal. App. 3d 982, 115 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1974).
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There are, of course, significant limitations on the utility of the
approach. Succinctly put, there can be no construction where there is no
statute. There must be some legislative enactment amenable to interpre-
tation in order for the courts 'to expand indigent rights by means of
liberal construction. Further, the courts cannot take unlimited license
with a statute. There are bounds beyond which language and logic may
not be stretched without running contrary to the rule of law itself. Such
limitations compel no more, perhaps, than the observation that there is
presently no perfect vehicle by which to furnish counsel and a transcript
to the indigent litigant in every civil action.
A. Right to Transcript
Two cases decided the same day, one denying a free transcript to an
indigent and one furnishing it, illuminate the liberal construction ap-
proach of the California courts in this area. In Leslie v. Roe,157 a
California district court of appeal reaffirmed earlier decisions'58 and
denied a transcript to an indigent seeking to appeal an adverse judgment
in a personal injury case. The court referred to Ferguson and Boddie
and indicated that neither the common law nor the Constitution re-
quired provision of a transcript. Absent statutory authority, which the
court did not find, no transcript could be furnished. However, in Crespo
v. Superior Court,'59 the court did announce a limited right to free
transcript grounded in statute. Analysis of the pertinent statutes affords
an indication of the court's willingness to attenuate its construction in
order to provide the indigent a free transcript, when a more restrained
interpretation would have resulted in denial.
In Crespo, the state sought to terminate the appellant parent's custody
of his child under Civil Code Section 232, which provides for such
termination where the parent has abandoned the child. Alleging indi-
gency, appellants sought a free transcript for the purpose of appealing
the lower court's adverse judgment."'0 The appellate court granted the
free transcript, observing that Civil Code Section 237.5 required ap-
pointment of counsel for the indigent parent at the initial hearing and
that Civil Code Section 238 preserved the right of appeal for a parent
unsuccessful at the trial level.' The inference could be drawn, the
court said, that the legislature would not guarantee a right to appointed
counsel and a right to appeal, only to impair that right to appeal by
failing to furnish a free transcript.
0 2
157. 41 Cal. App. 3d 104, 116 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1974) (2nd D.C.A.).
158. See cases cited note 111 supra.
159. 41 Cal. App. 3d 115, 115 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1974) (2nd D.C.A.).
160. Id. at 117, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 682.
161. Id. at 118-19, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
162. Id.
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The inference may be equally well drawn, of course, that where the
legislature sought to guarantee counsel and appeal so explicitly, its
failure to mention free transcripts indicates a lack of intent to include
them. But even granting that the court's inference is well drawn, it
would seem to stand only if there is a right to counsel guaranteed on
appeal as well as at trial. If counsel on appeal is not made a matter of
right for the indigent, then no inference lies that the legislature intended
to enact special safeguards for indigents, such as a right to free tran-
script, at the appellate level.
No statute expressly guarantees right to appointed counsel on appeal.
However, Civil Code Section 237.5 states that at the initial proceedings
concerning the state's petition to terminate parental custody: "The court
may appoint counsel to represent the minor whether or nor the minor is
able to afford counsel, and, if they are unable to afford counsel, shall
appoint counsel to represent the parents." The court appears to have
interpreted this provision to confer a right to counsel on appeal. In
defining the showing that must be made to obtain a free transcript, the
court states:
The appellant and counsel should first make the same minimum
showing of indigency and merit to the appeal required at the ap-
pellate level by Ferguson v. Keays,.... .Second, counsel should
submit a declaration showing the grounds of the appeal and the
reasons why a transcript is necessary for effective appellate re-
view.
1 0 3
Thus the criteria for obtaining a transcript seems to presuppose that the
indigent appellant possesses counsel. Section 237.5, however, makes
mention only of hearings at the trial court level. No mention is made of
any appellate proceedings. The court simply did not directly address the
question of how it determined that counsel on appeal was guaranteed,
though it pointed out that in In re Rodriguez"", another appellate court
appointed counsel for an indigent parent undertaking an appeal. In
Rodriguez, however, the parent was incarcerated at the time and was
clearly unable to prosecute his own appeal. Further, Rodriguez did not
announce a right to counsel on appeal. The decision merely noted that
counsel had been appointed. 65 If counsel is not guaranteed on appeal,
the strength of the inference that the legislature intended the indigent to
enjoy unimpeded access to the appellate level appears to diminish.
163. Id. at 119-20, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 684.
164. 34 Cal. App. 3d 510, 110 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1973).
165. Id. at 513, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
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The court's position is not without some logical force, of course. It
may be reasoned simply that the appointment of counsel in the initial
proceeding under Section 237.5 is intended to carry through to the final
adjudication of the issues in dispute and that to limit counsel to the trial
level would be to afford rather truncated rights to the indigent. This is
apparently the view taken by the court and it is neither illogical nor
unreasonable. It would appear, however, not to be the better reasoned of
the two reasonable choices.
The juxtaposition of Leslie and Crespo, handed down the same day
by the same court, provides an insight into the court's attitude. Leslie
reaffirms the court's reluctance to adopt the common law or constitu-
tional arguments in this area, while Crespo can be read as indicative of a
court reaching beyond the most reasonable construction to attain what it
views as a socially desirable goal: furnishing a transcript to an indigent
appellant.
B. Right to Counsel
By far the most striking example of a court's willingness to stretch
thin its logic in order to extend rights to indigents lies in In re Simeth,16
which overruled In re Robinson.167
In Robinson the state sought to renew the status of appellant's
children as dependents of the court in a hearing convened under Welfare
and Institutions Code Section 729. On appeal, appellant urged that she
had been denied a right to counsel at the hearing. The court of appeal
rejected any such constitutional right, and said further that no statutory
right to counsel existed.168 In canvassing the statutes on which appellant
had relied as supportive of a right to counsel and which the court had
rejected, the court's opinion listed Welfare and Institutions Code Sec-
tions 634, 679, 700, 729, and Government Code Section 27706(e).
Four years later, in Simeth, the same appellate court overruled Robin-
son, and held specifically that counsel must be afforded on appeal as a
matter of statutory right to indigent parents appealing from an adverse
decision in a dependency hearing. The court stated that amendments to
statutes in the years intervening since Robinson furnished a basis for
overruling Robinson.1 60 The court specifically excluded constitutional
and common law grounds as rationales for its decision.170
166. 40 Cal. App. 3d 982, 115 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1974).
167. 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678 (petition for hearing denied October
1, 1970, id. at 787), cert. denied sub nom., Kaufman v. Carter, 402 U.S. 964 (1970).
169. 8 Cal. App. 3d at 785-86, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 679-80.
169. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 985-86, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
170. Id.
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The statutes relied upon for the overruling included all those men-
tioned in Robinson, as well as Penal Code Section 1241,171 which deals
with compensation of court-appointed counsel. A comparison of all
these statutes, as they stood at the time of the Robinson decision and as
they stood in amended form at the time of Simeth, indicates that the
intervening amendments do not substantially support the Simeth court's
reasoning. An analysis of these statutes is instructive.
At the time Robinson was decided, Welfare and Institutions Code
Section 634 provided that in a hearing to declare a child a dependent of
the court under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 600, the court
had the discretion to appoint counsel for indigent parents.' 72 Appoint-
ment of counsel was not mandatory. Section 634, as amended at the
time of the Simeth decision,'7 9 left unaffected the dependency hearings
with which Robinson and Simeth were concerned and primarily affected
wardship hearings.17 4 The changes in Welfare and Institutions Code
Section 634 would not appear then, logically, to have affected the
Simeth decision.
1 5
The next statute noted in the Simeth opinion is Welfare and Institu-
tions Code Section 679, which permits the minor to be represented by
counsel of his own choosing and further requires appointment of coun-
sel to represent indigent minors in wardship hearings. This statute was
unchanged between the Robinson and Simeth decisions.
Similarly, Welfare and Institutions Code Section 700 provided at the
time of both the Robinson and Simeth decisions that appointment of
counsel in dependency hearings was discretionary with the court.' The
intervening amendments only affected the minor's right to counsel in
wardship proceedings.
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 729 pertains to the notice
requirements prior to a dependency hearing, and does not speak to the
substantive question of a right to counsel.
171. CAL. PEN. CODE §1241, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1971, C. 1158, §1, at 2180.
172. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §634, as amended CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 1223, §1,
at 2332.
173. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §634, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 667, §2,
at 1322.
174. A child may be determined to be a dependent of the court where he lacks ef-
fective parental guidance or support or where he is physically dangerous to the public
because he suffers some physical or mental deficiency. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §600.
A child may be adjudged a ward of the court where he habitually refuses to obey his
parents or school authorities, or where he is found to have violated the law. CAL. WELF.
AND INST. CODE §§601, 601.1, 602.
175. An amendment unmentioned by the court is Welfare and Institutions Code Sec-
tion 634.5, added in 1971, which provides that at a dependency hearing convened under
section 600(d), counsel must be furnished to the minor. The hearing in Simeth, however,
was covered under section 600(a).
176. CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE §700, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 1223, §2,
at 2333; as amended, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 625, §2, at 1242.
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Government Code Section 27706 deals with the duties of the public
defender. At the time of the Robinson decision, Section 27706(e)
provided that upon court order, the public defender might represent
indigent parties at wardship hearings. As amended at the time of
Sirneth, it had been broadened to include dependency hearings as
well.17 7 However, representation still hinged upon the court order, a
matter of discretion with the court, and not a right inhering in the
indigent.
At the time of the Robinson decision, Penal Code Section 1241
provided for compensation for attorneys appointed by the California
Supreme Court or any appellate court to represent criminal defendants
on appeal or in other proceedings. 178 As amended at the time of the
Simeth decision, it dealt with compensation in criminal as well as civil
matters. 7 9 Obviously, however, provision of compensation for attorneys,
where appointed to represent indigents, is not tantamount to announcing
a right of indigents to that representation.
The statutes relied upon in Simeth, then, furnish very little direct
support for the proposition that a statutory right to counsel in dependen-
cy hearings had arisen due to legislative enactments in the years inter-
vening since Robinson. The court undertook to support its conclusion,
however, by quoting an amicus brief filed by the District Attorney of
Los Angeles County which argued that legislative intent dictated the
decision in Simeth. 8 ° This argument is supported by reasoning that
since intervening amendments authorized the public defender to repre-
sent the indigents in dependency hearings, upon court order, 181 and
authorized a mode of payment for appointed counsel in civil appeals, 182
the legislature manifested an intent to confer a right to counsel.' 88 This
argument may be overreaching. While it may be manifest that the
legislature intended to invest the court with discretion to appoint counsel
for the indigent, it does not appear that it intended to afford counsel as a
matter of right. Thus in Simeth and Crespo a court rejected the com-
mon law and constitutional arguments advanced in support of an in-
digent's right, and instead granted relief grounded in an interpretation
of the statute which, while perhaps not unreasonable, is nevertheless less
compelling logically than another, more restrained, construction.
177. CAL. GOV'T CODE §27706(e), as amended, CAL. STATS. 1971, C. 1800, 1, at
3896.
178. CAL. PEN. CODE §1241, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 17, §108, at 848.
179. See note 171 supra.
180. 40 Cal. App. 3d at 984, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
181. CAL. GOV'T CODE §27706(e), as amended, CAL. STATS. 1971, C. 1800, 1, at
3896.
182. CAL. PEN. CODE §1241, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1971, c. 1158, 1, at 2180.
183. See 40 Cal. App. 3d at 984, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
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CONCLUSION
This comment has attempted to suggest that the courts are reluctant
to extend to indigent civil litigants a right to counsel or transcript under
the common law and constitutional arguments successfully advanced in
the past to obtain a waiver of fees. The reasons for this reluctance are
two-fold. First, those arguments, as presently made, appear to be self-
limiting, and do not impel the courts to undertake further expansions.
Second, there is a legitimate concern that the cost in dollars and man-
power of furnishing counsel or transcript may prove so burdensome on
the judicial system as to outweigh any benefit gained.
In place of the common law or constitutional rationale, the courts of
California have manifested their concern for the legal situation of indi-
gents by employing a liberal construction of statutes where possible.
Although clearly limited to situations where there is present a statute
susceptible to interpretation, this liberal construction possesses two ad-
vantages. It escapes the theoretical difficulties inherent in the constitu-
tional and common law approaches, and it allows for a gradual and
controlled expansion of rights, thereby affording the judicial system an
opportunity to assess and absorb the practical impact of each incremen-
tal extension. Obviously, however, liberal construction is not an ultimate
answer to the question of inequalities before the bar of justice.
Rather the answer, if there is to be one, must come from the legisla-
ture which, unlike the courts, is free from the constraints of nearly
closed-ended theoretical rationales and better able to gather information
on the practical implications of expanded rights. In this regard, it must
be marked as significant that the courts appear inclined to put aside
constitutional and common law arguments in the area, and to cleave
instead to statutes for authority even where those statutes offer only a toe
hold, for it points to the conclusion that the judicial branch is in fact
looking to the legislature to perform the broader fact-finding and policy-
weighing role for which it is designed.
Thomas Sutton Knox
